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ESTATE OF CALHOUN

[44 C.2d

)
[L. A. No. 22987.

In Bank.

Apr. 26, 1955.]

Estate of GEORGE A. CALHOUN, Deceased. DAISY OREB,
as Administratrix, etc., Appellant, v. WALTER WILLIAM PETTIT, Respondent.
[1] Decedents' Estates-Appointment of Administrator-Persons
Entitled.-Requirement of Prob. Code, § 422, that relative may
claim priority to letters of administration only when he is
entitled to succeed to decedent's estate or some portion of it is
in addition to his other qualifications.
[2] Descent-Source of Right: Adoption-Origin of Right.-Rights
of inheritance, as well as subject of adoption and rights and
obligations resulting from it, are entirely matters of statutory
regulation.
[3] Adoption-Inheritance.-Prob. Code, § 257, when enacted in
1931, did not change existing law relating to right of inheritance by and from adopted children, but is restatement of it.
[4] Id.-Inheritance.-It must be presumed that construction
placed on provisions of former Civ. Code, § 1386, by previous
court decisions, to effect that adoption effects change in status
for purpose of inheritance only between child and his natural
parents and between him and his adoptive parents, was carried
into new sections of Prob. Code, and that § 257 of such code
is restatement of that construction.
[5] Id.-InheritaDce.-While adopted child inherits from his
adopting parents, he does not inherit through them from relatives of adoptive parents.
[6] Descent-Persons Who Take-Brothers and Sisters.-Inherit.
ance between adopted child and his foster brothers and sisters
is excluded from words "brother or sister" within meaning of
Prob. Code, § 225, directing line of succession to estate of
intestate.
[7] Adoption-Power of Legislature.-Supreme Court may not
usurp legislative function to change statutory law with respect
to adoption of children, however desirable it might be to effect
complete substitution in family relationship.
[8] Descent-Source of Title as Affecting Succession.-Statute of
succession, in providing for disposition of separate property
of one dying intestate, makes no distinctions based on channel
through which property may have come to decedent.

[1] See Oal.Jur.2d, Executors and Administrators, § 128 et seq.
[3] See Oal.Jur.2d, Adoption of Children, § 48 et seq.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Decedents' Estates, § 72; [2] Descent,
§ 5; Adoption, § 2; [3, 4] Adoption, § 38; [5] Adoption, § 39; [6]
Deaoent, 116; [7] Adoption, § 3; [8] Descent, § 8.
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APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County revoking letters of administration to one
party and granting letters of administration to another party.
Stanley Mosk, Judge. Affirmed.

J

Charles C. Morrison for Appellant.
Richard McLeod for Respondent.
Louis Thomsen as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Respondent.

,

EDMONDS, J.-Letters of administration in the estate of
George A. Calhoun were issued to Daisy Oreb, the natural
daughter of Calhoun's adoptive parents. Her appeal from
an order revoking those letters and appointing Walter William Pettit, a natural brother of the decedent, as administrator, presents for determination the conflicting claims of
Mrs. Oreb and the blood relatives of Calhoun to the right
to succeed to his estate.
These facts are stipulated:
George was the youngest of four children born to William
and Anna Fortna. Each of the children, when less than 4
years old, was adopted into a different family. Elder sisters,
Leona and Ruth, were taken into families whose identities are
not shown by the record. His brother, James William, in
1913 at the age of 2 years was adopted by the Pettit family
and given the name of Walter William. In 1917, when 4
years old, George was adopted by Ezra and Victoria Calhoun,
who had an older daughter, Daisy.
The decedent's estate consists entirely 0:1: his share of the
estate of Victoria Calhoun, his adoptive mother, who predeceased him by about two years. Surviving him were Daisy
Oreb, Walter Pettit, his natural sister Ruth Rice, and the
issue of his deceased sister, Leona. Both his natural parents
and adoptive parents predeceased him. There are no other
surviving relatives.
Mrs. Oreb petitioned for letters of administration upon
the ground that she is the decedent's sister. Section
422 of the Probate Code, l which specifies the persons entitled
:U t Administration of the estate of a person dying intestate must be
granted to one or more of the following persons, who are entitled t6
letters i». the following order, the relatives of the decedent beinK eD-
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to have letters issued, includes "brothers and sisters." (Subd.
(5).) Although that subdivision has not been construed in
connection with the question as to whether foster brothers and
sisters are included within it, the terms used to designate
other relationships have been deemed sufficiently broad to
include those resulting from adoption. (Cf. Estate of Camp,
131 Cal. 469, 470 [63 P. 736, 82 Am.St.Rep. 371] [child];
Estate of Mercer, 205 Cal. 506, 507 [271 P. 1067] [issue of
predeceased spouse] ; Estate of Grazzini, 31 Cal.App.2d 168,
172-173 [87 P.2d 713] [children]; Estate of Summers, 51 Cal.
App.2d 39, 40 [124 P.2d 941 [grandchild].) For the purposes
of the present case, it may be assumed that a foster sister, if
otherwise qualified, may claim the right to letters of administration.
[1] According to section 422, a relative may claim priority
to letters of administration only when he is entitled to succeed to the decedent's estate or to some portion of it. This
requirement is in addition to his other qualifications. (Estate
of Sayers, 203 Cal. 753, 756 [265 P. 924] ; cf. Estate of Herriott, 219 Cal. 529, 531 [28 P.2d 355].) As the parties agree,
the controlling issue is whether Calhoun's natural brother or
his foster sister is entitled to succeed to his estate.
[2] Rights of inheritance, as well as the subject of adoption and the rights and obligations resulting from it, are
entirely matters of statutory regulation. (Estate of Jobson,
164 Cal. 312, 315 [128 P. 938, 43 L.R.A.N.S. 1062]; In re
Darling, 173 Cal. 221, 223 [159 P. 606].) Necessarily, the
claim of each of the parties to the right to share in Calhoun's
estate depends upon the effect to be given to section 225 of
the Probate Code, which provides: "If the decedent leaves
neither issue nor spouse, the estate goes to his parents in
equal shares, ..• or if both are dead in equal shares to his
titled to priority only when they are entitled to succeed to the estate
or some portion thereof:
I I (1) The surviving spouse, or some competent perllOD. whom he 01'
she may request to have appointed.
"(2) The children.
"(3) The grandchildren.
" (4) The parents.
I I (5) The brothers and sisters.
"(6) The next of kin entitled to share In the estate.
"(7) The relatives of a previously deceased spouse, when Stlch rela·
tives are entitled to succeed to some portion of the eatatQ.
"(8) The public administrator•
.. (9) The creditors.
"(10) .AJq persoa leKalq competent-"
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brothers and sisters and to the descendants of deceased
brothers and sisters by right of representation."
Mrs. Oreb's position is that the words "brothers and sisters" must be read as referring to the relationships resulting
from the decedent's adoption, and as excluding his natural
brothers and sisters. She contends that adoption effects a
complete change in the child's status, terminating the right
of his natural relatives to inherit from him and substituting
as heirs his adoptive relatives. A somewhat different theory
is that she is entitled to succeed to Calhoun's estate as the
issue of her deceased parents. Pettit argues that an adoption
affects the right of inheritance only between the child and his
natural parents and between him and his adoptive parents.
The earliest California statute regulating adoption made
specific provision as to its effect upon inheritance. It declared in part: "A minor, when adopted, shall be entitled to
the name of the party adopting, and the two thenceforth shall
bear towards each other the legal relation of parent and child,
and the minor shall enjoy all the legal rights and subject
to all the duties appertaining to that relation; except, however, that if the adopted child leaves descendants, ascendants,
brothers or sisters, the party adopting, nor his relatives, shall
not inherit the estate of the adopted child .... " (Stats.
1869-1870, p. 530, 531.) When the Civil Code was enacted, a
similar provision was included in it. However, that statute
omitted the clause in regard to inheritance. It read: "A
child, when adopted, takes the name of the person adopting,
and the two thenceforth sustain towards each other the legal
relation of parent and child, and have all the right and are
subject to all the duties of that relation." ( § 228.) Minor
changes in wording were made the following year, and as so
revised the section has remained unchanged until the present
time. (Amendments to the Codes, 1873-1874, p. 195.)
Other sections of the Civil Code enacted at the same time
included 227, which provided that upon adoption the judge
should "make an order declaring that the child shall thenceforth be regarded and treated in all respects as the child of
the person adopting" and section 229 which declares: "The
parents of an adopted child are, from the time of adoption,
relieved of all parental duties towards, and all responsibility
for, the child so adopted, and have no right over it."
I'll, re Newman, 75 Cal. 213 [16 P. 887, 7 Am.St.Rep. 146],
collBtrued these sectiollB in connection with subdivision 1 of
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former section 1386 of the Civil Code 2 with regard to the
right of an adopted child to succeed by inheritance to the
estate of the adopting parent. The court concluded that it
was necessary to read "child" and "children" in section
1386 of the Civil Code as including adopted children in order
to give effect to the requirements that an adopted child, by
virtue of that status, is to be "regarded and treated in all
respects as the child of the person adopting" and is to "have
all the rights and be subject to all the duties of the legal
relation of parent and child." (Accord: In re Williams, 102
Cal. 70, 82 [36 P. 407, 41 Am.St.Rep. 163] ;
In re Johnson,
98 Cal. 531 [33 P. 460, 21 L.R.A. 380] ; In re Evans, 106 Cal.
562, 564-566 [39 P. 860].)
In Estate of Jobson, 164 Cal. 312 [128 P. 938, 43 L.R.A.N.S.
1062], the right of the natural parent of an adopted child
to succeed to his estate was considered. The court noted that
section 229 of the Civil Code relieved the parents of an
adopted child "of all parental duties towards, and all responsibility for, the child" and of all right over it. It was
held that the statutes relating to adoption implied that "the
natural relationship between the child and its parents by blood
is superseded." (P. 317.) The question of the right of inheritance of collateral relatives of the child and adopting
parents was expressly left open.
However, when In re Darlmg, 173 Cal. 221 [159 P. 606],
concerning the right of an adopted child to succeed to the
estate of his natural grandparent, came before the court, it
said: "The adoption statutes of this state do not purport
to affect the relationship of any person other than that of
the parents by blood, the adopting parents, and the child. It
is the person adopting and the child who, by the express terms
of the section, after adoption 'shall sustain towards each other
the legal relation of parent and child and have all the rights
and be subject to all the duties of that relation,' and it is

ct.

'''When any person having title to any estate dies without disposing
of the estate by will, it is succeeded to and must be distributed . . . in
the following manner:
"1. If the decedent leave no surviving husband or wife, but leave
issue, the whole estate goes to such issue; and if such issue consists of
more than one child living, or one child living and the lawful issue of one
or more deceased children, then the estate goes in equal shares to the
children living, or to the child living, and the issue of the deceased
child or children, by the right of representation."
In 1931, the provisions of former section 1386 of the Civil Code were
reenacted in the Probate Code as sections 220·229, and 231. (Stata.
1»31, 00. 281, p. 596·598.)
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the parents by blood who, from the time of the adoption, are
'relieved of all parental duties towards, and all responsibilities
for the child so adopted, and have no right over it,' and are,
in the eyes of the law, no longer its parents. The adoption
simply fixes the status of the child as to its former and adopted
parents. To its grandparents by blood it continues to be a
grandchild, and the child of its parents by blood. It does not
acquire new grandparents in the persons of the father and
mother of an adopting parent.
"It is only in so far as it is necessary to protect the full
rights of the child as a child of the adopting parents and the
corresponding rights of the adopting parents as father and
mother of the adopted child that the statutes relative to adoption can play any part in the construction of section 1386 of
the Civil Code, the inheritance statute here involved. As
was said in Hockaday v. Lynn, 200 Mo. 456 [98 S.W. 585,
118 Am.St.Rep. 672, 9 Ann.Cas. 775, 8 L.R.A.N.S. 117]: 'In
fact, it may be laid down as a general conclusion that while
the statute of adoption must be read into the statute of dower
and that of descents and distribution, it is with this singularity always to be observed, viz., that the adopted child is
so let in only for the purpose of preserving in full its right
of inheritance from its adoptive parent.'
"This was followed by the statement 'and the door to
inheritance is shut and its bolt shot at that precise point,'
a statement which appears to be sustained by the authorities
generally in the absence of plain statutory provision to the
contrary." (Pp. 225-226.)
Cases arising in other states were reviewed extensively and
were said to be consistent with this conclusion. "So far as
we have been able to find, there is no decision given under
statutes anything like ours to the effect that the adopted child
has any right of inheritance as to the ancestors or collateral
kindred of the adopting parents, or is deprived by the adoption
of any right of inheritance that he had as to the ancestor and
collateral kindred of his parents by blood." (P. 226.)
In Estate of Pence, 117 Cal.App. 323 [4 P.2U 202], the
adopted son of decedent's predeceased brother sought to succeed as next of kin, pursuant to former section 1386 of the
Civil Code, subdivision 5. (Now Prob. Code, § 226.) Upon
the reasoning of the Darling case, it was held that "the rights
of inheritance of an adopted cl1i1d, although complete with
respect to the a(lopting parent, do not extend to the collatera!
relatives of that parent." (P. 333.)
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In these cases, all of which were decided prior to 1931, the
statutes relating to the right of succession considered in connection with those relating to adoption, had been construed
as follows: (1) the adopted child inherits from his adopting
parents and they inherit from him; (2) upon adoption he
ceases to inherit from his natural parents, and they cease to
inherit from him; (3) the adopted child's status with regard
to other natural relatives is not changed, and his right to
inherit from them is not cut off by the adoption; and (4) by
the adoption the child does not gain the right to inherit from
collateral relatives of the adopting parents. Although no case
squarely decided that collateral relatives of the adopting
parents may not inherit from the child, it was stated in the
Jobson case, supra, " [w] hatever the rule may be with respect
to the right of succession, it must apply to both parties
alike. " (164 Cal. 315.)
In 1929, the Legislature created a code commission to
revise, codify and restate the probate law. (Stats. 1929,
p. 1427.) The commissioners' report was accepted, and in
1a31 the Probate Code was enacted. Sections 227, 228 and
229 of the Civil Code relating to adoption were not changed
but a new provision was added which reads: " An
adopted child succeeds to the estate of one who has adopted
him, the same as a natural child; and the person adopting
succeeds to the estate of an adopted child, the same as a natural
parent. An adopted child does not succeed to the estate of a
natural parent when the relationship between them has been
severed by the adoption, nor does such natural parent succeed
to the estate of such adopted child." (Prob. Code, § 257.)
[3] This statute did not change the existing law relating
to the right of inheritance by and from adopted children, but
is a restatement of it. "The commissioners realized that they
were not authorized to propose changes in the substance of
the existing laws, for in the report whi('D. they submitted with
the draft of the Probate Code they stated: 'By the statute
creating the Code Commission, its powers are limited to preparing such "restatement as would best serve clearly and
correctly to express the existing provisions of law," and it
is not within the province of the Code Commission to embody
in its report any substantial changes in the existing laws.'
( Cal. Prob. Code, Commissioners' Report, 1930, p. 10.)"
(Estate of Hebert, 42 Cal.App.2d 664,667-668 [109 P.2d 729].)
In the Hebert case, the effect of the enactment of section
257 of the Probate Code upon an adopted child's riiht to
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suc~eed by representation was considered. The court said:
"The same legislature which enacted the code section above
quoted [section 257 of the Probate Code] also enacted section
222 of the Probate Code, which was based upon section 1386
of the Civil Code. Both of these sections provide that the
issue of a decedent shall inherit by right of representation.
At the same time the legislature continued in effect the adoption provisions of the Civil Code, sections 227-229. These
sections had theretofore been construed as granting inheritance rights to the children of a predeceased adopted child of
the adopting parent. (Citations. )
"If a statute has been judicially construed and is later
reenacted in the same or substantially the same terms it is
presumed that the legislature was familiar with the construction which had been placed upon the statute by the courts
and that such construction, in the absence of an express
provision requiring a different construction, was adopted by
the legislature as a part of the law. (Citations.) It is clear
that if section 257 had been omitted when the Probate Code
was enacted it would have been the clear duty of the court
to declare the respondents to be the heirs of decedent. We
find nothing in section 257 requiring any other determination,
since it is a 'restatement' designed to 'clearly and correctly
express the existing provisions of law' as interpreted by the
courts. " (42 Ca1.App.2d 668.)
That reasoning is equally applicable to the other provisions of former section 1386 of the Civil Code reenacted in
the Probate Code. [4] It must be presumed that the construction placed upon them by previous decisions, to the effect
that adoption effects a change in status for the purpose of
inheritance only between the child and his natural parents
and between him and his adoptive parents, was carried into
the new sections, and that section 257 of the Probate Code is
a restatement of that construction.
Since 1931, the cases considering section 257 have uniformly
so construed it, and have applied it so as toexdllde a right
of inheritance between an adopted child and kindred of the
adopting parents. (Estate of Jones, 3 Cal.App.2d 395, 400
[39 P.2d 847] [holding an adopted daughter of the testatrix'
husband's predeceased brother was not the husband's" heir' '] ;
Estate of Stewart, 30 Cal.App.2d 594, 598 [86 P.2d 1071]
[holding that the adopted children of the testator's cousin
are not "next of kin "1; Estate of Kruse, 120 Ca1.App.2d
254, 256 [260 P.2d 969) [holding that the adopted daughter'
44 C.2d-li

)
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of the testatrix' sister is not an "heir"} ; see also Estate of
Pierce, 32 Ca1.2d 265, 269 [196 P.2d 1] ; comment 25 Cal.L.
Rev. 81, 85-87.) [5] As stated in the Kruse case, "It has been
consistently held that an adopted child while he inherits from
his adopting parents does not inherit through them from the
relatives of the adoptive parents." (120 Cal.App.2d 256.)
[6] In no decision has the court determined the status of
an adopted child as a "brother or sister" within the meaning
of section 225 of the Probate Code. However, the basis for
excluding rights of inheritance in cases concerning members
of the adopting family other than the parents is that adoption
affects only the rights between the child and his nat"ural
parents and between him and his adopting parents. From that
principle it logically follows that inheritance between an
adopted child and his foster brothers and sisters is excluded.
Dictum in Estate 0/ Esposito, 57 Cal.App.2d 859 [135 P.2d
167], supports this conclusion: "It has never been held,"
said the court, "so far as we are advised, that adoption does
more than substitute foster parents for natural parents, without affecting the relationship of the child toward its relatives
by blood and without creating new relationships with the
kindred of the foster parents. So far as the right of inheritance is concerned, the child does not acquire new brothers
and sisters in the persons of the natural children of the
adoptive parents (citation) nor lose the brothers and sisters
of its own blood." (Pp. 865-866.)
Mrs. Oreb relies upon several decisions as indicating a
legislative intent to make a more complete substitution in
the status of the adopted child than is indicated in the cases
which have been discussed. These decisions, however, do not
involve the right of intestate succession except insofar as
that right stems from a statute applicable because of the
child's status in relationship to the adopting parent. They
are consistent with the principle of the Darling case, and
many of them expressly recognize and approve its reasoning.
(C/. Estate of Mercer, 205 Cal. 506, 508 [271 P. 1067] [adopted
daughter of predeceased husband as "child" under former
Civ. Code, § 1386, subd. 8; now Prob. Code, § 228]; Estat,
of Winchester, 140 Cal. 4G8 [74 P. 10], and Estate of Morril,
56 Cal.App.2d 715 [133 P.2d 452] [considering an adopted
child as "issue" for the purposes of inheritance tax exemptions]; Estate of Wardell, 57 Cal. 484 [pretermitted heir
statutes] ; Estate 0/ Esposito, supra, 57 Cal.App.2d 859 [antilapse atatutoJ; I8e comment, 25 Cal.LoRey. S1, 85-8'1.)
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Both Mrs. Oreb and Pettit have cited many decisions in
other jurisdictions. These and other cases are collected in
annotations in 38 American Law Reports 8, and 120 American
Law Reports 837, where the determination of the question here
concerned is said to depend upon the wording of the particular statute involved. Because of the various and conflicting provisions of the statutes, there is no basis upon which
the cases in other states may be reconciled.
When the original adoption statutes were enacted, adoptions were infrequent and most often occurred when the
parents consented to the adoption of their child by persons
known to them, or as a consequence of the assumption of care
and custody of an orphan by a blood relative. Under presentday conditions it may be the better social policy to substitute
the relationship of the adoptive family for that of the blood
relatives. With many children placed for adoption by agencies
licensed for that purpose, there has developed a demand for
secrecy as to the identity of the blood relatives, and in most
cases, for all practical purposes, an adopted child is entirely
cut off from his natural family relationships.
[7] This court may not usurp the legislative function to
change the statutory law which has been uniformly construed
by a long line of judicial decisions. (See Estate of Stewart,
30 Cal.App.2d 594, 598 [86 P.2d 1071] ; note 2 D.C.L.A. Law
Rev. 269.) Moreover, any change should be made only
after a complete examination of all of the consequences. If
adoption is to effect a complete substitution in family relationship, the legal rights of collateral relatives should be fully
considered in connection with statutes relating to pretermitted
heirs, inheritance taxes and the like.
[8] Finally some significance is attached to the fact that
Calhoun's estate consists of property to which Mrs. Oreb
would have succeeded had George predeceased his adoptive
mother, and to the alleged fact that he had never known his
natural parents or natural brother. The record is silent upon
the latter point, and the former is fully answered by the court
in the Jobson case: "It may properly be observed •.. that
the rights of the parties are not affected by the circumstance
that the estat.e in dispute was derived entirely from the adopting parent. The source from which the property came may
well influence one's notions of the natural equity of the appellant's claim. But our statute of succession, in providing
for the disposition of the separate property of one dying
intestate, makes no distinctions based upon the emmnel
)

...
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through which the property may have come to the decedent."
(164 Cal. 314.)
The order is affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Schauer, J., and Spence, J., concurred.
TRAYNOR, J.-I dissent.
The interpretation placed upon the relevant statutes by
the majority opinion results in consequences totally at variance
with the objective of making the relationship between adoptive
parents and their adopted child as close to the natural relationship as possible. (See Adoption of McDonald, 43 Cal.
2d 447, 459 [274 P.2d 860] ; In re Santos, 185 Cal. 127. 130
[195 P. 1055]; 2 Armstrong California Family Law, 12421243. ) Children who have been raised together as brothers
and sisters are set against one another whenever intestate
succession from another than their parent is involved,
and rights of natural kindred whose existence or identity will frequently be unknown to the adoptive family
are allowed to intervene between foster brothers and sisters
who have known no others. Although the Legislature has
made detailed provisions for the issuance of new birth certificates and the sealing of original records in cases of adoption
to promote and protect the adoptive relationship (Health &
Saf. Code, §§ 10251-10254), in many cases of intestate succession this policy of secrecy will have to be evaded or the
estates of adopted children will perforce escheat to the state.
In other cases, natural grandchildren who have been adopted
will be permitted to claim as pretermitted heirs of natural
grandparents who had no knowledge of their existence or
identity. (Prob. Code, § 90.) The statutes do not expressly
provide for these results, and in my opinion by adopting the
Probate Code in 1931 the Legislature did not accept and approve of the interpretation placed upon the superseded provisions of the Civil Code by In re Darling, 173 Cal. 221 [159
P. 606].
As the majority opinion points out, by enacting section
257 of the Probate Code,· the Legislature did not change the
.,' An adopted child succeeds to the estate of one who has adopted him,
the same ag a natural child; and the person adopting succeeds to the
estate of an adoptcd ehild, the same as a natural parent. An adopted
child does not succeed to till' estate of a natural parent when the relationship between them has lwrl1 s('\'el'cc] hy the adoption. nor does such
natural parent succeed to the c~tate of such adopted child."
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existing law governing intestate succession by or from adopted
children (see also Estate of Hebert, 42 Cal.App.2d 664, 6-67668 [109 P.2d 729]), and that section only governs rights
of inheritance between the adopted child and adoptive parents
and the adopted child and natural parents. Thus, to determine whether an adopted child may inherit through an
adoptive parent or whether natural relatives may inherit
from an· adopted child through its natural parent, it is
necessary to construe the provisions of the Probate Code
in the light of the provisions of the Civil Code governing the
status of an adopted child.
Section 228 of the Civil Code provides: "A child when
adopted, may take the family name of the person adopting.
After adoption, the two shall sustain towards each other the
legal relation of parent and child, and have all the rights
and be subject to all the duties of that relation." Section
229 provides: "The parents of an adopted child are, from
the time of the adoption, relieved of all parental duties toward,
and all responsibility for, the child so adopted, and have no
right over it." In interpreting these statutes in In re Darling,
supra, the court stated: "The adoption statutes of this state
do not purport to affect the relationship of any person other
than ·that of the parent,s by blood, the adopting parents, and
the child. It is the person adopting and the child who, by
the express terms of the section, after adoption 'shall sustain
towards each other the legal relation of parent and child and
have all the rights and be subject to all the duties of that
relation,' and it is the parents by blood who, from the time
of the adoption, are 'relieved of all parental duties towards,
and all responsibilities for the child so adoptcd, and have no
right over it,' and are, in the eyes of the law, no longer its
parents. The adoption simply fixes the status of the child
as to its former and adopted parents. To its grandparents by
blood it continues to be a grandchild. and the child of its
parents by blood. It does not acquire new grandparents
in the persons of the father and mother of an adopting parent." (173 Cal. 221. 225-226.) It is immediately apparent
that the court in the Darling case failed to give effect to the
provision of the statute that the adopted child shall have "all
of the rights" of "the legal relation of parent and child,"
and accordingly recognized only a restricted and imperfect
"legal relation of parent and child. " Thus a child is entitled
to inherit from his grandparent only because he is the child
of the deceased child of the grandparent and thus aolely
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because of the parent-child relationship. An adopted child is
not given all of the rights of that relationship if he may not
also inherit from his adoptive grandparent or through his
adoptive parent in any case in which a natural child could
do so.
The conclusion that the court erred in its interpretation
of section 228 in the Darling case finds further support in
legislative history. The forerunner of section 228, after providing that the adoptive parent and child should "bear toward each other the legal relation of parent and child," and
that the child should "enjoy all the legal rights and [be]
subject to all the duties appertaining to that relation," expressly stated "except, however, that if the adopted child
leaves descendants, ascendants, brothers or sisters, the party
adopting, nor his relatives, shall not inherit the estate of the
adopted child. . . . " (Stats. 1869-1870, pp. 530-531.) Thus
the Legislature clearly recognized that the legal relation of
parent and child would result in the child's becoming a member of the adoptive family for all purposes of inheritance
and expressly provided for the exceptions thought desirable,
and it must be presumed that it intended to change the law
when it deleted the exception in 1872. (In re Trombley, 31
Ca1.2d 801, 806-807 [193 P.2d 734].)
The rationale of the Darling case has never been consistently followed. In other situations involving adopted
children it has been recognized that the adoptive relationship
necessarily affects the status of the adopted child with respect
to third parties. Thus, even in In re-Darling it was recognized that if an adopted child is to have "all of the rights"
of the parent-child relationship, his children must in turn be
allowed to inherit from their adoptive grandfather (173
Cal. 221, 225: see also Estate of Winchester, 140 Cal. 468,
469-470 [74 P. 10]), and in Estate of Pierce, 32 Ca1.2d 265,
270 [196 P.2d 1], it was pointed out in discussing the antilapse statute (Prob. Code, § 92) that" 'The law •.. creating
the status is found in section 228 of the Civil Code providing
that" after adoption the two shall sustain towards each other
the legal relation of parent and child, and have all the rights
and be subject to all the duties of that relation." . . . That
such adopted child is to be considered an "issue" and a lineal
descendant of the adopting parent, has been on several occasions recognized by our courts . . . • To exclude adopted
children from its scope woul(l be to say that they are not entitled as to the adopting pal'cnt, to the full rights of natural
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children, which is contrary to the express prOVISIOn of the
statute.'" (Quoting from Estate of Moore, 7 Cal.App.2d
722,724 [47 P.2d 533, 48 P.2d 28] ; see also Estate of Tibbetts,
48 Cal.App.2d 177, 178 [119 P.2d 368] ; Estate of Esposito,
57 Cal.App.2d 859,865 [135 P.2d 167].) Although the Pierce,
Tibbetts, and Esposito cases recognized the rule of the Darling case, none of them explained why the provisions of section 228 must be read into section 92 of the Probate Code but
be ignored in considering intestate succession through an
adoptive parent, and the statutes themselves provide no basis
for such a distinction. If section 228 of the Civil Code requires that the adopted child be allowed to take from his
adoptive grandparent under the antilapse provisions of section 92 of the Probate Code, it must also require tllat he be
allowed to take by intestate succession. In either situation he
can take only because he is a child of the adoptive parent, and
if the adoption changes his status with respect to the adoptive
grandparent in one situation it must do so also in the other.
If it is true that the Legislature adopted the rule of the
Darling case when it enacted the Probate Code in 1931, it
might be suggested that the Moore, Tibbetts, and Esposito
eases, decided since that time, should be disapproved. The
Darling case did not, however, represent a settled rule in this
state at the time it was decided (see Estate of Jobson, 164 Cal.
812, 817 [128 P. 938, 43 L.R.A.N.S. 1062], expressly leaving
the question open), and the cases that have followed it were
all decided after the Probate Code was enacted. (Estate of
Pence, 117 Cal.App. 323, 333 [4 P.2d 202] ; Estate of Jones,
8 Cal.App.2d 895, 398 [39 P.2d 847] ; Estate of Stewart, 30
Cal.App.2d 594, 596-597 [86 P.2d 1071]; Estate of Kruse,
120 Cal.App.2d 254, 255-256 [260 P.2d 969].) Moreover, in
1928, the court rejected the rationale of the Darling case in
Estate of Mercer, 205 Cal. 506 [271 P. 1067], and held that
an adopted child of a predeceased spouse could take under the
predecessor of section 228 of the Probate Code on the death
of the surviving spouse. "Appellant admits that the word
'issue' in several places in said section does include an
adopted child. Again, an adopted child has been held to be
a lineal descendant of the adopting parent. [Citations.] If
this be conceded, it argues strongly for the ruJe that an
adopted child is entitled to any legacy the law gives to the
children of an adopting parent." (205 Cal. 506, 511.) AI.
though the Mercer case has' been distinguished from the
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Darling case on the ground that the adopted child in the
Mercer case did not inherit through her predeceased adoptive
mother but indirectly from her (see Estate of Kruse, 120 Cal.
App.2d 254, 257 [260 P.2d 969]), this distinction is not
justified in the light of the cases that have considered the
character of succession under section 228. That section "is as
much a part of the law of succession as any other, and those
who inherit under it take as heirs of the decedent widow or
widower, not as the heirs of the predeceased spouse." (Estate
of Watts, 179 Cal. 20, 23 [175 P. 415].) "The respondent's
relationship to her deceased mother would be the determining
factor in establishing her status as an heir of [her stepfather] ;
but the title to the property she is entitled to receive by
reason of that status would not relate back for its origin,
to her mother. It would come directly to her from her stepfather. She would take as . . . [his] heir. . . . " (Estate of
Marshall, 42 Cal.App. 683, 687 [184 P. 43] ; see also Estate
of Jobson, 164 Cal. 312, 314 [128 P. 938, 43 L.R.A.N.S. 1062].)
Moreover, the Mercer case was not decided on the theory that
the adopted child inherited indirectly from her predeceased
adoptive parent but on the ground, as noted above, that she
was "entitled to any legacy that the law gives to the children
of an adopting parent."
It thus appears that both before and after the enactment
of the Probate Code the cases have been in essential conflict
with respect to inheritance by ur from adopted children.
Given the conflicting theories relied upon in the cases decided
before the enactment of the Probate Code and the fact that
the last decision before that time was clearly not in harmony
with the relationale of the Darling case, it cannot reasonably
be said that the Legislature adopted the rule of that case
when it enacted the Probate Code. Accordingly, this court
is free to resolve the conflict in the decisions in the light of
the clearly expressed policy of section 228 of the Civil Code
and sections 10251 to 10254 of the Health and Safety Code.
Whatever doubt there may have been with respect to that
policy in the past, it is clear today that the objective of
adoption is the" consummation of the closest conceivable counterpart of the relation of parent and child," in which the
child becomes a member" to all intents and purposes, of the
family of the foster parents." (In re Santos, supra, 185 Cal.
127, 130; see also Adoption of McDonald, s'u,pra, 43 Ca1.2d
447,459 (274 P.2d 860].) Only by tl'eating the adoptive child

)

as a natural child for all purposes of inheritance
objective obtained.
The order should be reversed.
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Carter, J., concurred.
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was d('nied May 25,
1955. Carter, J., and Traynor, J., were of the opinion that
the petition should be granted.
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